The Future of Owning Bitcoin | Jonathan Pollock

Emergency exit to KYC Exchange doesn’t seem very sovereign. How about an emergency safety network of my own making with distributing my own Tapsigner keys? All I need is the minimal trust that the trusted network of people won’t lose the key card, and make it available upon request. While that one piece of key material is exposed it should be able to interact with the Bitkey system to make a multi-sig emergency vault tied to the original vault but with zero balance until needed. The Bitkey system pre-configures the emergency exit vaults and I distribute the Tapsigner keys. Say there are three safety contacts then the attacker would need to know all three and collect them first before coming for the Bitkey. Emergency compliance for a full vault withdrawal would generate a transaction to the requested address for some minimum amount of sats and then select at random one of the emergency vaults from the safety network. At that point the attacker has confirmation that they received some amount of bitcoin and can see on chain that the remaining balance was sent to a different address. But the victim doesn’t know which person in the safety network now has control. Only the Bitkey system knows which Tapsigner was used to create the emergency vault and delays notification as to which contact is needed. After a delay the victim and safety network are notified and collect either all Tapsigner cards or only the one that was used for the emergency vault. Access to the emergency vault requires that you restore your Bitkey system and have access to the Tapsigner key card. Failure to do that then moves the funds from emergency vault to inheritance protocol. Programmable money.

How does a Fedimint, or multiple Fedimints, help to solve/complicate this scenario?